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DISCOURSE OF DISOBEDIENCE:
LAW, POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, AND TRIALS
OF CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS
HADAR AVIRAM
ABSTRACT

This Article examines the way legal systems respond to social
problems through a discursive analysis of a unique and timely issue:
conscientious objection to military service based on political and
ideological grounds. It explores how legal systems, conducting criminal
justice procedures under conditions of warfare and dissent, attempt to
maintain balance between addressing the extra-legal challenges
presented to them through conscientious objection, and preserving the
prevalence of legal inner logic, classification, and interpretation.
As opposed to the jurisprudential and philosophical literature
about conscientious objection, this Article approaches the issue through
an empirical analysis of legal and judicial discourse in a particular case
study. It follows the fascinating story of the left-wing conscientious
objection movement in Israel, following the escalation of the IsraeliPalestinian conflict beginning October 2000. It then examines the two
cases that made it to Israeli military courts, analyzing the legal
procedures and the verdict language to learn how the legal system chose
to construct its perception of the defendants, their actions, and the
desired policy.
As the Article claims, while the court seeks to eventually
preserve the ethos of military service and to discourage ideological
dissent, it also strives to maintain legitimacy for its decisions under
heavy media coverage, civilian scrutiny and political unrest. Therefore,
* PhD Candidate, Jurisprudence and Social Policy Program, University of California,
Berkeley. LL.B., M.A (Crim.) Hebrew University of Jerusalem. I thank Malcolm
Feeley, Kristin Luker and Neil Fligstein for their useful comments on my doctoral
dissertation, from which this paper stems, as well as to Hila Keren for her helpful
comments on the draft and to Noam Finger for his assistance in proof-translations; I
am also grateful for the Fulbright Fellowship and Cancellor Dissertation Award which
facilitated this project.
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it allows the objectors to bring up extra-legal, political, biographical
and philosophical issues, and awards them exceeding procedural
flexibility. The eventual verdicts, however, reflect the doctrinal-legal
tendency to reduce complex personalities and situations into
monolithic, mutually-exclusive categories, to facilitate a workable
classification of the offenders for normative purposes.
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I. INTRODUCTION: How LAW THINKS ABOUT CONSCIENTIOUS
OBJECTION

Political dissent to military service in controversial
circumstances, and the way legal systems address it, is a timely and
controversial subject linked with several current international conflicts.
Recently, CBS News reported of 5,000 deserters from the American
forces in Iraq who provide conscientious reasons for their resistance. 1
Thousands of miles away, the ever-changing realities of the IsraeliPalestinian conflict, most recently in the escalation of the conflict since
October of 2000,2 give rise to political activism and dissent which are
partly manifested as movements for conscientious objection to military
service. 3
Both of these legal systems, as well as many other legal systems
in different times and places,4 face unique challenges when presented
1. Deserters: We Won't Go to Iraq (CBS television broadcast December 9, 2004).
See CHARLES C. MOSKOS & JOHN WHITECLAY CHAMBERS, THE NEW CONSCIENTIOUS
OBJECTION: FROM SACRED TO SECULAR RESISTANCE (Oxford University Press 1993),
for other examples of secular, politically-motivated resistance in the American Army
in recent conflicts.
2. The most recent of these developments is the Israeli governmental decision to
separate from the occupied territories, a move which will include the evacuation of
Jewish settlements. See Herb Keinon, Sharon, Mofaz Sign Evacuation Orders,
JERUSALEM POST, Feb.

20, 2005, at 1.

3. During the escalation of the conflict, conscientious objection was an exclusively
left-wing phenomenon, stemming from objection to serve in the territories and
collaborate with the occupation. See Sarah Leibovitz-Dar, The New Frontierof
Objection, HA'ARETZ, Dec. 8, 2000. The recent changes in the political situation,
described in supra note 2, at 1, albeit supported by many Israelis and Palestinians
alike, are giving rise to similar initiatives from religious right-wing soldiers, who
object to the evacuation of Biblical Israeli territory. See Israeli Soldiers May Refuse
Orders (CBS television broadcast January 3, 2005). Since the latter movement has
only just emerged, and has not been yet put to the test of reality and law, this Article
analyzes the legal policy toward the former movement.
4. See, e.g, KEITH L. SPRUNGER, VOICES AGAINST WAR: A GUIDE TO THE

SCHOWALTER ORAL HISTORY COLLECTION ON WORLD WAR I CONSCIENTIOUS

OBJECTION (Rev. ed., Bethel College 1981); SUE KINCHY, PROFILES INCONSCIENCE:
200 YEARS OF CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION INTHE ARMED FORCES (1973).
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with offenders with political and ideological motives, particularly in
times of war, which invariably raise moral and humanitarian dilemmas
of warfare ethics, as well as a sense of patriotism and concern for
national safety. 5 The legal system may feel the need to uphold laws of
compulsory draft, whether permanent or ad hoc, 6 in order to maintain
order and cohesion, if not consensus, in times of unrest; at the same
time, it needs to maintain respect, and an open ear, to the moral
dilemmas, whether objective or subjective, faced by those whom it
judges.
This Article offers a way to understand how legal systems
consider conscientious objection from a fresh and unusual perspective.
Rather than suggesting philosophical and jurisprudential guidelines for
legal policy, 7 the Article uses a case study - the Israeli military legal
system's response to the conscientious objection wave following the Al
Aksa Intifada of 2000 - to enter a legal system's collective mind and
examine how it perceives and addresses the phenomenon of
conscientious objection; how much of these perceptions are shaped by
the political and ideological issues driving the objectors; and how much
of them are shaped by law's inner logic and knowledge-production
mechanisms. As the case study shows, the legal system is not
insensitive to the extra-legal dimensions of the conscientious objection
problem, and it allows the objectors significant procedural flexibility, as
well as a substantive "voice", in the process. However, for the purpose

5. Moral dilemmas are particularly evident in conflicts that require military personnel
to confront civilian populations. See COLM McKEOGH, INNOCENT CIVILIANS: THE
MORALITY OF KILLING IN WAR (Palgrave Macmillan 2002); See also MICHAEL
WALZER, ARGUING ABOUT WAR (New ed., Yale University Press 2006).

6. In Israel, military service has been a general duty since the State's inauguration in
1948. See Security Service Act, 1982 (Isr.). See JAMES M. GERHARDT, THE DRAFT
AND PUBLIC POLICY: ISSUES IN MILITARY MANPOWER PROCUREMENT, 1945-1970 (Ohio

State University Press 1971), for a discussion on how general draft policies shift
across time in the United States.
7. Such discussions constitute the backbone of the rich tradition of literature on the
subject. See, e.g., CARL COHEN, CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE: CONSCIENCE, TACTICS AND

THE LAW (Columbia University Press 1971); Carl Cohen, Conscientious Objection, 4
ETHICS 269 (1968); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (Universal Law Publishing
Co. Ltd. 2005), Michael Walzer, The Obligationto Disobey, 77(3) ETHICS 163 (1967).

HeinOnline -- 9 J.L. Soc'y 4 2008

2008 Aviram

of justifying its decisions in conscientious objection cases, the system
reduces and simplifies the offenders and their actions into monolithic,
mutually exclusive categories, which allow it to apply workable
classifications and interpretations using formal legal logic. The Article
claims that this duality of flexibility and adherence to legal thought
patterns allows the system to reach a politically desirable outcome convicting and punishing the offenders - while awarding it external
legitimacy stemming from its fairness and objectivity.
The analytical framework informing the Article's cuest into the
legal system's mind is Foucault's governmentality theory. While this
framework is applicable to a variety of settings involving policy and
knowledge, it is used in this Article to analyze the particular case of
criminal justice policy.
Governmentality focuses, analytically and methodologically, on
the connection between power - exercised at various levels, from state
power to power over the self- and knowledge. 9 Foucault observes an
interplay between:
a 'code' which rules ways of doing things... and a
production of true discourses which serve to found, justify
and provide reasons and principles for these ways of doing
things. To put the matter clearly: my problem is to see how

8. Space precludes a full explanation of Foucault's theory; I therefore present a few of
its aspects which are most pertinent for the framework of this paper.
9. The framework was developed by Foucault in his lectures at the College de France
See Michel Foucault, Governmentality,in THE FOUCAULT EFFECT: STUDIES IN
GOVERNMENTALITY (Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, & Peter Miller, eds.,
University Of Chicago Press 1991), and, less explicitly, in other works, MICHEL
FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON (Vintage 1995);
MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY, VOLUME 1: AN INTRODUCTION
(Vintage 1990). However, Foucault's notion of "law" was rather narrow;
govemmentality developed to encompass the modem concept of law, using Weberian
ideas of legal rationality, in later projects drawing on his work. BURCHELL ET AL, ibid;
ALAN HUNT AND GARY WICKHAM, FOUCAULT AND LAW: TOWARDS A SOCIOLOGY OF
LAW AS GOVERNANCE (Pluto Press 1994); NIKOLAS ROSE, POWERS OF FREEDOM:

REFRAMING POLITICAL THOUGHT (Cambridge University Press 1999). For an analysis
comparing Foucauldian theory to other discursive frameworks, see NIELS AKERSTRON/
ANDERSEN, DISCURSIVE ANALYTICAL STRATEGIES: UNDERSTANDING FOUCAULT,
KOSELLECK, LACLAU, LUHMANN (Policy Pr. 2003).
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men govem (themselves and others) by the production of
truth. 0

The emergence of this "code" and the production of a "truth"
which informs and supports it is studied through different events,
approaches and practices, emerging in different social locations and
fields, to establish the "conditions of possibility"' I which constitute
ground for the emergence of ideas and policies. Rather than searching
for deep structural motivations for policy, governmentality attends to
"superficiality, an empiricism of the surface, of identifying the
differences in what is said, how it is said, and what allows it to be said
and to have an effectivity". 12 Governmentality is not interested
primarily in demonstrating the ideological distortions in official "truth",
but in documenting how the investment of power in forms of truth
transforms the way subjects and social institutions become problems for
government. Governmentality-influenced questions about a given legal
policy would be: how does the policy, initiative or program, perceive
the problem and the subjects involved in it? What realms of knowledge
influence this perception? Which forms of knowledge and expertise
allows for the problematization (or, in our case, criminalization) of
particular kinds of individual behaviors, or the adoption of a new
strategy or policy regarding a certain issue at a certain time and place?
What techniques and strategies are promoted as solutions for the
problem?
While several works advocate the applicability of
governmentality theory to the analysis of legal systems, 13 none have
incorporated it in empirical studies of legal verdict texts, though a very
similar, and parallel, enterprise was undertaken by Professor Jonathan
Simon in his masterful analysis of the Warren Commission. 14

10. Ibid. at 90.
11.

ROSE,

supra note 9, at 57.

12. Id.
13. BURCHELL ET AL, supra note 9; HUNT

AND WICKHAM,
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Analyzing the Commission's report of President Kennedy's murder by
Lee Harvey Oswald, Professor Simon highlights the important
discursive role of the Commission's report: "to fill the empty space...
15
with a believable explanation; ... to make sense of what happened."
This role is even more important in criminal cases, where what is said
in court and written in the verdict needs to constitute a plausible
justification for conviction and punishment (or for acquittal).
What is unique about legal cases and judicial decisions is that
the justification provided for the outcome of the case must be a legal
justification. Criminal justice procedures, decisions, verdicts and
sentences are based on legal logic, which consists of identifying the
appropriate rule for the specific situation presented to the court and
correctly applying it to reach the normative outcome. 16 This system of
logic is self referential: verdicts showing how these rules are applied
constitute, in themselves, instructions for the usage of rules on other
situations in the future. 17 The process of applying legal principles to
specific situations builds on a classification of the specific case at hand

14. Jonathan Simon, Ghosts of the DisciplinaryMachine: Lee Harvey Oswald, Life
History, and the Truth of Crime, 10 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 75 (1998).

15. Ibid. at 77.
16. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Legal Education as TrainingforHierarchy,in THE
POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE (David Kairys, Ed., Basic Books 1998);
WILLIAM TWINING AND DAVID MIERS, HOW TO Do THINGS WITH RULES: A PRIMER 0

INTERPRETATION (Butterworths 1999); KENNETH J. VANDEVELDE, THINKING LIKE A
LAWYER: AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING (Westview Press 1996). The
American legal system relies on jury decisions to establish guilt or innocence, limitin!
judicial reasoning to decisions in appellate instances; however, in non-jury legal
systems, such as the Israeli system, criminal verdicts include not only a statement as
to the outcome of the trial, but also a justification for reaching said outcome. In the

military justice system, described in this article, the obligation to provide reasoning
for verdicts can be found in article 440(9) of the Military Justice Act, 1955 (Isr.).
17. This is the idea behind the doctrine of staredecisis. Some theoreticians, primarily
Dworkin, see this doctrine as a manifestation of the constant legal enterprise of
interpretation, RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (Harvard University Press 1986).
Scholarship in the tradition of systems theory refer to this self referential quality of
law as "legal autopoiesis": NIKLAS LUHMANN, LAW AS A SOCIAL SYSTEM (Oxford

University Press 2004); Gunther Teubner, How the Law Thinks: Toward a
ConstructivistEpistemology of Law, 23(5) LAW & SOC'Y REV. 727 (1989).
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into legally-prescribed, mutually-exclusive categories, which prescribe
a normative outcome according to the category where the case
belongs. 18
However, case hearings and verdicts have additional audiences
and purposes: they are read by the parties, appellate judges, academics,
and the media, and have to convince these external institutions of their
validity and coherence. 19 A convicting verdict needs to narrate the
events in a manner which explains why the defendant's action
constitutes a violation of a legal duty; it is followed by a sentence,
which needs to explicate the circumstances in a manner that justifies the
amount and type of punishment inflicted upon the defendant. Both parts
of the decision need to show that the decision was reached in a way
which does not violate the principles that provide legal systems with
logic, and impartial
their legitimacy; their claim of objectivity,
20
implementation of universal principles.
This Article examines the way legal systems shape their
processes and decisions to fulfill these complex roles through an
analysis of the two conscientious objector cases which reached the
Israeli military court in the summer of 2003. The cases are presented
through a variety of military and journalistic sources, as well as through
interviews with the legal policymakers and representatives of the army
and the defendant, and through extensive courtroom observations
carried between June and October of 2003.
Part I of the Article provides an introductory overview to the
phenomenon of conscientious objection to serve in the Israeli army,
placing the problem in context of political philosophy, Israeli reality
and military law, and presenting the "conditions of possibility" for the
legal policy toward deserters. By showing the philosophical and
18. TWINING, supra note 16; VANDEVELDE, supra note 16; MAX WEBER, ECONOMY
AND SOCIETY (New Ed., University of California Press 1978); MAX WEBER,
CHARISMA AND INSTITUTION BUILDING: SELECTED PAPERS (University of Chicago

Press 1968).

19. This is necessary for obtaining legitimacy for the exercise ofjudicial power:
Douglas Hay, Property,Authority and the Criminallaw, in ALBION'S FATAL TREE:
CRIME AND SOCIETY IN EIGHTEENTH CENTURY ENGLAND (Douglas Hay, ed.,
Pantheon Books 1975).
20. See generally MARTIN SHAPIRO, COURTS: A COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL

ANALYSIS (University of Chicago Press 1986).
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cultural sources for the legal system's perception of conscientious
objection, this part provides a "genealogy" of ideas, and explains how
the system obtains and constructs its knowledge of the problem.
In Part II, the Article tells the story of the two conscientious
objector trials; it describes the political background for their emergence,
as well as the legal hearings themselves, emphasizing the manners by
which the objectors presented themselves and their ideologies and the
ways in which these presentations were perceived and addressed by the
system during the trials. The narratives of both cases show the court's
willingness to discuss extra-legal issues, such as the offenders' personal
biographies and the etiology of their political views, as well as the
flexibility it exhibited in shaping the procedural aspects of the trial; this
openness and flexibility, the Article argues, provided the court with
legitimacy for its decisions.
The court's decisions in the two cases are analyzed in Part III,
which shows, through a content analysis of the verdicts and sentences,
how the court chose to define the problem and regard the defendants.
This chapter examines the court's usage of legal and extra-legal sources
of knowledge about the problem and the goals it sought to achieve
using these sources and perceptions.
Finally, the conclusion places the analysis in context of the
discursive theoretical framework, shows the way the verdict shapes and
constructs knowledge about conscientious objection, and offers an
explanation of how the verdicts reflect both the court's and the
objectors' interests.
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II. CONSCIENTIOUS

OBJECTION IN ISRAEL: THEORY, POLITICS, AND
LEGAL DOCTRINE

A. What Is Conscientious Objection? Philosophical Definitions and
Moral Dilemmas
22
21
A rich literary tradition, both in Anglo-American and Israeli
literature, addresses the phenomena of conscientious objection,
focusing mainly on political and philosophical aspects of the problem,
such as the duty to obey the law and the right to disobey it based on
conscientious motives. While much of this discussion exceeds the
framework of this Article, it is important to point out two concepts from
this literature: conscientious objection and civil disobedience. The two
concepts provide a philosophical framework for a situation where a
person feels unable to follow the law because it conflicts with his or her
ethics. Some well known examples for such conflicts may be a
or
reluctance to pay taxes which finance a regime of slavery or racism,
23
engagement in nonviolent political activity against such a regime.
The definitions of conscientious objection and civil
disobedience slightly differ among thinkers, but for the purposes of this
project we may adhere to the definition given by Rawls. 24 Rawls sees
the two concepts as exceptions to the primafacieduty to obey the law.

21. For a few notable examples, see COHEN, RAWLS, and Walzer, supra note 7.
22. See, e.g., David Enoch, Some Arguments against ConscientiousObjection and
Civil Disobedience Refuted, 36(3) ISR. L. REV. 227 (2004); Chaim Gans, The Concept
of a Duty to Obey the Law, 17(3) MISHPATIM 507 (1987); Chaim Gans, Right and
Left: IdeologicalDisobedience in Israel,36(3) ISR. L. REV. 1(2004); Alon Harel,
UnconscionableObjection to Conscientious Objection:Notes on Sagi and Shapira,
36(3) ISR. L. REV. 219 (2004); Barak Medina, PoliticalDisobedience in the IDF: The
Scope of the Legal Right of Soldiers to Be Excusedfrom Taking Part in Military
Activities in the OccupiedTerritories, 36(3) ISR. L. REV. 73 (2004); Amir Paz-Fuchs
& Michael Sfard, The Fallacies of Objections to Selective Conscientious Objection,
36(3) ISR. L. REV. 111 (2004); Avi Sagi & Ron Shapira, Civil Disobedience and
Conscientious Objection, 36(3) ISR. L. REV. 181(2004).

23. See HENRY DAVID THOREAU, CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE AND OTHER ESSAYS (Dover
Publications 1993). See also Martin Luther King, Letterfrom Birmingham Jail

(1963)(on file with author).
24. RAWLS, supra note 7, at 363.
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He refers to civil disobedience as "a public, nonviolent, conscientious
yet political act contrary to law usually done with the aim of bringing
about a change in the law or policies of the government., 25 Rawls states
that conscientious objection might somewhat overlap a broad
interpretation of civil disobedience; 26 conscientious objection does not
require appealing to the sense of justice of the majority, and does not
seek common ground, but entails the premise that one's personal
conscience - not necessarily political - is at odds with the constitutional
order. The two categories are therefore different, but not mutually
exclusive.
B. The Compulsory and Egalitarian Military Service Ethos:
National Heritage, Consensus, and Dissent
Addressing the possibility of conscientious objection as an
exception to the primafacieduty to obey the law was a particularly
problematic issue in the Israeli army. Since the inauguration of the
Israeli state, military service has been a national duty,27 as well as a
seminal social institution, 28 supported by a captivating ethos of
compulsory and egalitarian service.

25. Id.
26. Id.
27. See Security Service Act, 1982 (Isr.). The national service duty includes a period
of regular service (approximately three years for men and two for women), followed
by a lifetime of yearly reserve service determined by one's gender and military
specialization. However, see Avishai Margalit & Moshe Halbertal, Liberalism and the
Right to Culture, in MULTICULTURALISM 1N A DEMOCRATIC AND JEWISH STATE
(Menachem Maunter, Avi Sagi & Ronen Shamir, eds., 1998), for a discussion on how
some groups are exempted from military service, such as Ultra-Orthodox Jews,
Orthodox women and Israeli Arab citizens.
28. This role is mostly constructed around the army's perception as "melting pot" of
the Israeli multi-cultural society, YAGIL LEVY, THE OTHER ARMY OF ISRAEL:
MATERIALIST MILITARISM IN ISRAEL

(2003). Official narratives still refer to the army

under the social slogan of "army of the people"; see the IDF official webpage,
http://www.idf.il (last visited Dec. 7, 2004). The army is also credited for generating

social status and material advantages,

BARUCH KIMMERLING, THE INVENTION AND

DECLINE OF ISRAELINESS: STATE, SOCIETY AND THE MILITARY
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This ethos owes its creation to the Israeli formative national
heritage, and particularly to the trauma and lessons of the Holocaust. In
the new State, formed as a solution to the problem of anti-Semitism and
Jewish persecution, "new Jews" - strong, proactive, rooted to the land will defend themselves. The necessity of a formidable Israeli defense
29 constructing
shaped the army's image as an essential institution,
30
unpatriotic.
and
objection to serve as dangerous
Simultaneously, the lessons of the Second World War and the
Holocaust highlighted the importance of the Israeli army's moral worth.
31
The army was presented as following ethical and humane guidelines,
engaging only in "no-choice wars," 32 and maintaining a clear
distinction between permissible and impermissible acts of war (such
' 33 as
attacking civilians), through the concept of "cleanliness of arms."
Claims to the contrary, emerging in the Lebanon war and the first
Intifada, are therefore presented as unfounded, and objecting to serve
based on supposedly unethical military practices are discounted.3 4
of California Press 2005). Many Israeli politicians often invoke their military
backgrounds, IMMANUEL VALD, THE GoRDic KNOT: MYTHS AND DILEMMAS OF
NATIONAL SECURITY (1992); even dissenting groups expressing political opinions
often lean on military experience and expertise as providing them with the "right," or
the legitimacy, to speak of political matters. For an ironic and extreme example, see
the extensive use of ranks and military experience in the conscientious objectors'
website, http://www.seruv.orz.il, (last visited Mar. 2, 2005).
29. Even the army's name - the Israel Defense Forces - communicates this message.
30. See Menachem Finkelstein, Refusal to Serve in the Territories:Decision of the
Military Advocate General,16 ARMY AND L. 713 (2002).
31. In the early 1990s, these were formulated as the IDF's ethical code. ASA

KASHER,

MILITARY ETHICS (1996).

32. This overarching narrative is discussed and criticized in recent historical accounts
of Israeli wars, proposing instead that the history of armed conflict is a "history of
alternatives." Ilan Pappe, The New History of the 1948 War, 3 THEORY AND CRITIQUE
99.
33. KASHER, supra note 31. The concept of "cleanliness of arms" and the ethical
solution of moral dilemmas is thoroughly discussed in Israeli literature: S. YIZHAR,
HIRBET HIz'AA; THE CAPTIVE (1949).
34. For an overview of this position see Gans, supra note 19.
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Finally, being the army of an immigration country, 35 great
importance was ascribed to egalitarian military service as a mechanism
for social coherence and the establishments of shared ideals. 36 As a
"melting-pot" of Israeli society, the army must maintain social strength
and a country of immigrants serves together - the army as a mutual and
unifying institution. Dissent from this ideal, particularly based on
political claims that might cause ideological and social rifts in the army,
are therefore seen as a threat.
In light of these narratives as "conditions of possibility, '37 it is
not surprising that the Israeli legal policy limits the extent of its
recognition of conscientious objection. In an essential, defensive,
ethical and culturally unifying institution, as the army was constructed,
ideological objection to serve is perceived as politically dangerous,
ethically unsound and socially irresponsible. The rule for exemption
does, however, allow for possible exceptions and is based on a
distinction between pacifists and politically motivated objections.
Whereas declared, coherent and genuine pacifists who object to
participate in all warfare, are released from service, but people
objecting to selective wars or tasks - a euphemism for politically
motivated objections - are not. Consequently, their objection is
considered a Refusal to Obey Orders, an offense under article 122 of
the Military Justice Act of 1955.38 According to article 122, soldiers
must obey all orders (interpreted to include, first and foremost, the
initial order to enlist when called for) unless, as article 124 states,
"it is
' 39
clear and obvious that the order given to [them] was illegal."

35. Israel, designed to be a national home for Jews from all countries, provides
citizenship to all immigrating Jews: The LAW OF RETURN, 1950.
36. THOREAU, supra note 23.

37. See supra note 11 and the accompanying text.
38. See Gans, supra note 22; LEON SHELEFF, THE VOICE OF HONOR- CONSCIENTIOUS
OBJECTION OUT OF Civic LOYALTY (1987).

39. In fact, a soldier obeying a "clearly and obviously" illegal command could be
prosecuted for participating in an illegal act; a "clearly and obviously" illegal
command was defined, in the infamous Kfar Kasem massacre case of 1956, as a
command "bearing a black flag" of illegality: "not formal, hidden or half hidden
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The army and its legal system had to address conscientious
objection, based on pacifism as well as political reasons, ever since the
1950s, and objection to the occupation of the territories began as early
as the 1970s. 40 However, the first organized group of objectors emerged
during the 1982 war in Lebanon, as part of the left wing "Yesh Gvul"
movement. "Yesh Gvul," translated "there is a limit" in Hebrew,
advocated "selective" refusal according to the third distinction
mentioned above: the objectors refused to serve in Lebanon or in
Lebanon-related activities. 4 1 The concept of selective refusal was later
adopted in the 1988 Intifada to service in the territories, through some
of the objectors refused to serve in the army altogether during this time.
The Intifada refusal movement led to an increase in the size of overt
objection.42
The objection to the two wars had a common rationale. The
Israeli army had always declared itself a defensive, protective force,
rather than an aggressor; hence its name, "Israel Defense Force." The
warfare ethos upon which generations of Jewish Israelis had been raised
was based on the premise that all Arab-Israeli wars had been "wars of
no choice." 43 The Lebanon war, taking place on foreign soil, and the
Intifada encounters with enraged civilian population under occupation,
defied these traditional boundaries, and therefore created a "limit," or a
boundary, for the objectors. In addition, several Intifada objectors
invoked the legal defense for disobeying "clearly and obviously illegal
illegality... an illegality that stings the eye and enrages the heart, if the eye is not
blind and the heart is not obtuse or corrupted": CA 3/57, The Military Prosecutorv.
Malinki (1957) PM 17, 90.
40. See Gans, supra note 38; PERETz KIDRON, REFUSENIK! ISRAEL'S SOLDIERS OF
CONSCIENCE

(State University Press 1996); RUTH

ISRAELI SOLDIER AS A MORAL CRITIC

LINN, CONSCIENCE AT WAR: THE

(State University of New York Press 1996).

41. KIDRON, Ibid; LINN, Ibid.
42. See Ruth Linn, When the IndividualSoldier Says 'No' to War: A Look at Selective
Refusal During the Intifada, 33(4) J. PEACE RES. 14 (1996).
43. This premise is challenged in recent years, and many wars presented earlier as
"wars of no choice" are now said by some scholars to represent a "history of
alternatives", in which Israel had engaged in an aggressive role by choice: LEVY,
supra note 28; Pappe, supra note 32.
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commands," claiming that participating in the occupation fit into this
category.
C. A Socio-DemographicProfile of the ConscientiousObjection
Movement
Although the different waves of objectors varied somewhat over
time, they shared several political and socio-demographic
characteristics. Ideologically, while some individuals were exempted
from service based on their pacifist beliefs, the critical mass of
organized conscientious objection has been identified with the left-wing
end of the Israeli political map. 4 The involvement of conscientious
objectors in political activism increased over time; whereas the 1982
objectors to the war in Lebanon engaged in demonstrations against the
war, the 1988 objectors to service in the occupied territories were more
immersed in politically-oriented activities. The Intifada objectors, who
had already enjoyed the infrastructure of the Lebanon anti-war
movement, were more organized, and involved in political activism in
their civilian lives. 45 The new wave of objectors, brought about by the
2000 Al-Aksa Intifada, also supported left-wing views; however, in
their official petitions published in Israeli periodicals 46 they also
emphasized their identities as combat officers and soldiers, probably to
gain legitimacy in the eyes of more militant, less left-wing groups in
Israeli society.47
The new wave of objectors, brought about by the 2000 Al-Aksa
Intifada, also supported left-wing views; however, in their official
petitions published in Israeli periodicals 48 they also emphasized their
identities an combat officers and soldiers, probably to gain legitimacy

44. See Gans, supra note 22. This trait, however, may change in light of the recent
political development: see supra note 3 and the accompanying text.
45. See LINN, supra note 41; Linn, supra note 42.
46. See Petition, HA'ARETZ, December 1, 2002.

47. Aviv Lavi, We Have Sobered Up, HA'ARETZ, Dec. 27, 2002.
48. Petition,HA'ARETZ, December 1, 2002.
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in the eyes of more militant, less left-wing groups in Israeli society.49
This is evident from their usage of military uniforms and ranks in the
textual and graphic content of their website, as well as from the petition
itself:
" We, reserve combat officers and soldiers of the Israel
Defense Forces, who were raised upon the principles of
Zionism, sacrifice and giving to the people of Israel and to
the State of Israel, who have always served in the front lines,
and who were the first to carry out any mission, light or
heavy, in order to protect the State of Israel and strengthen
it.
* We, combat officers and soldiers who have served the State
of Israel for long weeks every year, in spite of the dear cost
to our personal lives, have been on reserve duty all over the
Occupied Territories, and were issued commands and
directives that had nothing to do with the security of our
country, and that had the sole purpose of perpetuating our
control over the Palestinian people. We, whose eyes have
seen the bloody toll this Occupation exacts from both sides.
* We, who sensed how the commands issued to us in the
Territories, destroy all the values we had absorbed while
growing up in this country.
* We, who understand now that the price of Occupation is the
loss of IDF?s human character and the corruption of the
entire Israeli society.
" We, who know that the Territories are not Israel, and that all
settlements are bound to be evacuated in the end.
" We hereby declare that we shall not continue to fight this
War of the Settlements.
" We shall not continue to fight beyond the 1967 borders in
order to dominate, expel, starve and humiliate an entire
people.
* We hereby declare that we shall continue serving in the
Israel Defense Forces in any mission that serves Israel's
defense.

49. Aviv Lavi, We Have Sobered Up, Ha'aretz, Dec. 27, 2002.
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* The missions of occupation and oppression do not serve this
purpose - and we shall take no part in them. 50
Although the conscientious objection movement is motivated
by, and ostensibly organized around, political views, some suggest that
the bond between members consist as much of social milieu as of
ideology. 5 1 Conscientious objectors from the 1982 Lebanon war and the
1988 Intifada have been identified as being primarily middle-class and
of Western (Ashkenazi) ethnicity.5 2 In some of the literature, the
objectors themselves prefer to present themselves as more diverse in
terms of social background; 53 however, in other studies their selfdescriptions reveal their more affluent backgrounds and connection
with Israeli academia. In a study examining the prison experiences of
reservists who were punished for conscientious objection to serve in the
territories, one of the interviewees provided the following profile of a
typical objector:
[H]igh or middle class, Ashkenazi, free occupations, a
higher percentage of academic background. The majority
from the center of the country, the center in Tel Aviv
University, high percentage of social sciences, doctoral
students, I know the ones that are active in the

50. A Combatant's Letter, http://www.seruv.org.i! (click on "to the English edition"
in the upper left corner; then click on "combatants letter" in the top bar).
51. LEVY, supra note 28. Levy connects between the social characteristics pointing to
the demilitarization of the elites, comprised of secular males of European
("Ashkenazi") ethnicity; according to his analysis, since the Yom Kippur war of 1973,
the social capital stemming from military and combat service has gradually eroded,
leading the elites to gain prestige through alternative vehicles such as technology, and
leaving military service as an arena for the social mobilization of less advantaged
groups, such as orthodox Jews, women, and people of Middle-Eastern and NorthAfrican ("Mizrachi") ethnicity.
52. LtNN, supra note 42.
53. See KIDRON, supra note 41.
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movement, but54 wouldn't be surprised if this is the
general profile.

In a collection of interviews focusing on the conscientious
objectors' political perspectives, 55 most interviewees describe their
socio-economic status as "affluent" or "middle-class". Only one of the
interviewees is a Jew of Eastern ethnicity; the others claim that they had
not been "privileged" in any special way because of their identity as
Westerners. Several of them correlate their acts with social, as well as
political, agendas; and one introspective objector observes that the
movement was comprised of intellectual-elitists because people who
grew up with a sense of entitlement from the consensus would feel
more comfortable breaking from it. 56 Even the Eastern-identified
interviewee states that his identity was not shaped to a great extent by
his ethnicity, which he now claims to regret. The younger objectors
describe politically active families, often comprised of members of the
Israeli intellectual elite.
In summary, the conscientious objectors appear to enjoy a
variety of social resources, stemming from both their strong political
conviction (and, subsequently, strong organization and mutual support)
and social status (reflected by their confidence, eloquence, and strong
support from capable families). The following subparts illustrate how
influential this ideological and demographic background was in their
encounters with the law.
D. The Legal Policy ConcerningConscientiousObjection
This rule according to which pacifism merits an exemption
from military service while politically-related refusal to serve
54. HADAR AVIRAM, When the Saints Go MarchingIn: Legal Consciousness and
PrisonExperiences of Conscientious Objectors to Military Service in Israel,in THE
NEW CIVIL RIGHTS RESEARCH 183,195 (Laura Beth Nielsen & Benjamin FleurySteiner, eds., Ashgate Publishing 2006.)
55. See RONIT CHACHAM, BREAKING RANKS: REFUSING TO SERVE IN THE WEST BANK
AND GAZA STRIP (Robert Hack, ed., Other Press 2003) (2003).

56 Ibid. at 53.
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constitutes a criminal offense was rather complex to uphold in the
1982 and 1988 waves of conscientious objection. Many commanders
were open to informal negotiations of altemative service with their
refusing soldiers, or turned a blind eye to reserve solders who left the
army based on medical, or mental health, reasons, or moved abroad.
Others treated their soldiers more harshly,
by sending them to prison
57
and expelling them from their units.
This informal treatment became somewhat more formalized in
1995, when the Chief of Personnel formed a special committee
(known by the soldiers as the "conscience committee"). The actual
circumstances behind forming the committee are unclear. Military
prosecutors claim that it was an institutional move to better organize
the policy for exempting personnel based on conscience and ideology.
However, defense attorneys, as well as critical literature, allege that
the committee might have been formed to anticipate a potential wave
of refusals from religious
58 right-wing soldiers in the event of
settlement evacuation.
The committee's formation was not publicly announced, nor
has its function been regulated in any act of legislation or
paperwork. 59 The unwritten guidelines for the committee's function
maintain the status quo preceding its existence: pacifists - defined for
legal purposes as people who object to any type of service in any type
of armed force - were exempted, whereas "selective objectors" those who rule out participation in an armed conflict only in certain
circumstances - were not. 6 0 The committee did not have authority to
make final decisions, but only to recommend an outcome to the Chief
of Personnel Unit. However, the committee's recommendations were
invariably affirmed by the official decision.
57. LINN, supra note 40 at 426.
58. Based on interviews with military prosecutors and defense attorneys (on file with
author). Also see LEVY, supra note 28.
59. The information about the committee's members and informal guidelines,
therefore, is obtained from the Ben Artzi petition to the High Court of Justice: HC
1380/02 Ben Artzi v. the Minister of Security (2002), PD 56(4), 76. (henceforth
referred to as the Ben Artzi Petition), as well as from newspaper reports: Tal Hassin, A
Trojan Horse in the Conscience Committee, Ha'aretz, July 18, 2003.
60. Hassin, id; See also Ben Artzi Petition, supra note 56.
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The committee is chaired by an officer from the Personnel
unit and includes a legal representative from the Military Attorney
General Unit (the Consultation and Legislation branch, which deals
with civilian affairs), as well as members of regulation and behavioral
science units. Until the High Court of Justice recommendation that a
civilian be appointed to the committee, made in the Ben Artzi
Petition, 61 it was comprised exclusively of military members.
Following the petition, the army began appointing a civilian member
to the committee. This member is invariably a volunteering
philosophy professor - a choice which reveals the army's conformity
to the dominant discourse on conscientious objection, and yet a
peculiar one considering the self-described objective of the committee
the applicants in question are honest
- a tool for finding out whether
62
in their claims of pacifism.
Throughout its existence between 1995 and 2003, the
committee heard 301 petitions for exemption from service, rejecting
245 (81%) of them, and exempting from service only 24 (8%). In the
remaining 32 cases (11%) the committee recommended "eased
service conditions. 6 3 According to the prosecutor, this last option is a
bonafide military attempt to accommodate the needs of soldiers who
do not have a problem belonging to an armed force, but express other
64
personal limitations, such as a reluctance to bear arms themselves.
Among the options offered to this group is, for example, the
possibility to serve in a civilian hospital.
The applicants are allowed legal representation, and may bring
with them any written material they choose, as well as two witnesses,

61. Ben Artzi Petition, Id.
62. This purpose was described by the committee chair in Ben Artzi's military trial:
Headquarters 129/03 (henceforth: the Ben Artzi case/verdict/sentence). See also
Hassin, supra note 56.
63. Data obtained from the prosecutor in the two conscientious objector cases (on file
with author).
64. This type of selective objection (as opposed to a politically motivated objection) is
better tolerated by the army, perhaps due to its individual nature and the fact that,
being a unique individual objection, it does not constitute a threat to the ethos of
compulsory and egalitarian military service.
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to support their claim of genuine pacifism. The attorney, however, is
only allowed in the room before and after the actual process: the
applicant is65 interviewed alone by the committee, and so are the
witnesses.
Any attempt to officially regulate military policy regarding
conscientious objection beyond the establishment of the committee
has been, so far, in vain. Several legislation initiatives sought to
legalize conscientious objection by allowing for any person claiming
conscientious reasons to be exempted from service. All initiatives, the
last of which was made in 1999, failed; the initiatives were strongly
opposed by the government and by the army. The Military Attorney
General's unit reasoned that allowing a general exemption would
practically make military service non-compulsory, and was therefore
categorically rejected.66
E. The Al Aksa Intifada and the New Wave of Left- Wing Objection
This was how matters stood when the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict escalated into a second Intifada in October 2000. The
reoccupation of Gaza and the West Bank in 2002 67 brought about a
"new objection frontier" of reservist soldiers, called The Courage to
Refuse movement." Beginning December 2002, the movement

published a petition declaring the members' intention not to perform
reserve service in the occupied territories. 69 Throughout the
subsequent months, which involved an escalation of the conflict in the
territories, many of the objectors who had signed the petition were
called for service, refused to attend, and were subsequently tried in
disciplinary hearings and sent to short imprisonment sentences. The
65. Ben Artzi Petition, supra note 56.
66. CONSULTING AND LEGISLATION BRANCH, doc. 35(20) (internal military
document; on file with author).
67. BBC News, (BBC television broadcast April 4, 2002).
68. Leibovitz-Dar, supra note 3.
69. A Combatant's Letter, supra note 48.
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reservist objectors' attempt to contest their disciplinary conviction
and request a formal criminal trial in court failed; the Military
Advocate General refused to grant them a trial, repeating the policy
according to which politically-motivated objectors are not exempted
from service, and stating that the army's activities in the territories
were legal. 70 His decision was affirmed by the High Court of
Justice.7 Subsequently, about 250 out of the 635 soldiers who signed
the petition were tried in disciplinary hearings and served short
72
imprisonment terms in military facilities. None of these reservist
cases ever reached the military courts.
The reservist movement was soon supplemented by a
movement of potential regular-service soldiers. During the summer of
2002, about 300 draft-age high-school students signed letters
addressed to the IDF Chief of Staff, protesting the occupation and
declaring their intention to object to service. As opposed to the
reservists who had only refused to serve in the occupied territories,
this younger group refused to serve anywhere in the IDF, explaining
that every role or position in the army would be assisting, directly or
indirectly, the occupation. Some of them stated their refusal upon
their arrival to the drafting office on their conscription day; others
sent letters beforehand. The army screened the different petitioners
based on their own declarations. Only those whose motives seemed
ambiguous and might have constituted pacifism were summoned to
the conscience committee; those who expressed clear political
motives were not summoned for a hearing. 74
70. FINKELSTEIN, supra note 30.

71. HC 7622/02, Zonshein et al v. The Military Advocate General (2002), PD 57(1)
726.
72. http://www.seruv.org.il (click on "English" link in the upper left, and then click
on "about us"). See also Aviram, supra note 52.
73. For a retrospective about the letter, see
http://www.newprofile.orglshowdata.asp?pid=144. Some of these groups were related
to the youth groups of the "New Profile" movement, an organization aimed at
demilitarizing Israeli society.
74. Headquarters 151, 174, 205, 222, 243/03 Military Prosecutorv. Matar (2003);
excerpt published in: THE REFUSENIKS TRIALS (eds: Dov Khanin, Michael Sfard,
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Military personnel documents obtained from the prosecutor
show that the army was closely following each and every case of
objection. A special personnel document 75 contains a list of objectors
and their military data (medical and psychometric exam results), and
refers to the proceedings in committees and disciplinary hearings in
their matters. In several cases, the objectors were awarded exemptions
from service for reasons related to narcotics and other personal issues,
which were "neutral," non-conscientious grounds. A few people are
listed as "agreed to serve" (the circumstances are not noted) and some
of them are "scheduled for a meeting with parent" and military
officials. This systematic monitoring of individuals reflects the
military regard of each of the 300 or so high-school students as an
individual challenge.
The personal attention to each of the objectors was also
evident in the way the army initially dealt with them, which reflects
the army's commitment to the ethos by which "everyone can serve."
In the height of the refusal movement, the army was prepared to offer
service options to match the soldiers' needs (like the abovementioned
"eased service conditions"), as long as these did not clash with the
needs of the system.76 The degree to which this tendency was beyond
what would be awarded to a regular soldier with problems was left
unclear.
III. THE CONSCIENTIOUS

OBJECTOR TRIALS OF

2003

A. PoliticalDissentersor Mutineers? The Left- Wing Conscientious
Objection Movement and "The Five" Case
While some of the military "problems" with conscientious
objection were solved through disciplinary hearings and back-door
exemptions from service, some objectors were more persistent. Five
Sharon Rotbard) (2004), 205 (henceforth referred to as "The Five" case). (page
numbers refer to the unpublished original courtroom record).
75. Military Personnel Unit, Report on Draft Refusers - Conscience (IDF,2003).
76. Interview with the prosecutor in the conscientious objector cases (on file with
author).
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of the regular service objectors had repeatedly refused to enlist and
could not be quietly accommodated otherwise. Three of them were
not summoned by the Conscience Committee, as their actions and
motivations demonstrated clearly that they were not pacifists, and
therefore would not be exempted based on the current policies. After
several repeated disciplinary hearings, and according to a reportedly
new, harsher, prosecution policy, 77 the five objectors were finally
tried together for Refusal to Obey Orders. 78 All five retained the same
attorney, Dr. Dov Khanin, a prominent jurist with a political
background in the radical socialist political party "Hadash." The
military prosecution chose Captain Yaron Kostelitz, a young and
promising member of the Chief Military Prosecutor's office, to
handle all affairs pertaining to conscientious objectors. 79 Kostelitz, an
Orthodox Jew, was reportedly chosen for this task not only for his
formidable professional talents, but also "because we needed
someone that would be convinced of his righteousness and without
any conflict about the case." 80 The main defense argument claimed
the existence of a "right to conscience" as a basic right and a legal
defense against the indictment.
After the objectors were arrested, and following a consultation
in court in which the prosecution's agreement was obtained, they
were released to "open detention," enabling them relative freedom
and the ability to appear for the hearings uncuffed.8' While in "open
77. Arye Dayan, Refusingfor the Sixth Time? You 'll Be Court-Martialled,HA'ARETZ,
2003.
78. Military Justice Act, Article 122 (1955) (Isr.).
79. In interviews with me, both the prosecutor and his commanders mentioned the
parties' representatives' personal backgrounds as pertinent to the trial (transcriptions
are on file with author).
80. Interview with the Chief Military Prosecutor (on file with author).
81. "Open detention" is a unique military version of bail conditions. The soldiers
are not held in custody; instead, they are assigned duties in military units and
subjected to their authority. Under "open detention", a soldier is subjected to much
easier and milder conditions than in a custodial or correctional military facility. The
drawback for many soldiers is, however, the fact that "open detention" time is not
deducted from the term of imprisonment, if such a sentence is imposed.
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detention" the defendants wore uniforms but they appeared in court in
civilian clothes. 82 The prosecutor, with little encouragement from the
court, did not officially insist on military attire and the court, intent on
providing as much "space" and fairness to the defendants, and careful
not to appear as an arbitrary military tribunal, did not demand it. This
allowed the defendants a symbolic victory, in the sense that in their
public appearances, as opposed to their hidden
detention duties, they
83
did not submit to the military apparatus.
The trial began in March 2003 and ended with a convicting
verdict on December 16 th and a prison sentence in early February
2004. Each stage of the process was contested by the objectors. The
defense attorney attempted to dismiss the indictment claiming that the
law discriminated against the defendants, all male, by allowing
84
women the possibility of exemption based on conscientious motives
and also claimed that the flaws in the conscience committee's work
amounted to an "outrageous injustice" that required refraining from
trying the defendants. These claims, as well as a lack ofjurisdiction
claim, were categorically rejected by the military court. The court
referred to the release of women as a mistake, but one that did not
amount, even with the addition of other flaws, to such an "outrage"
that would justify dismissing the indictment.
Following the opening speeches in April, the defendants were
finally heard on June 2 3 rd and July 14 th . The five objectors were directexamined one by one and only following all direct examinations were
82. Courtroom observations, June-September 2003 (field notes are on file with
author).
83. The attire issue was eventually introduced into the trial in the prosecutor's
summary. The prosecution's claims that the defendants were not "genuine" moral
objectors, but civil mutinees with political aims, were supported by the fact that they
had no moral objection to wearing uniforms within the unit. Although this claim was
rejected by the court in the final verdict, it upset the defense counsel and the audience,
and brought about harsh word exchanges and commotion in the courtroom. In this
manner, the physical fact of clothing was translated to the legal vocabulary as a
representation of submission, or non-submission, to legal status.
84. Security Service Act, Article 36 (1982) (Isr.); the article has since been narrowly
reinterpreted by the Israeli Supreme Court to exempt women from service only based
on religious and ethnic grounds.
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cross-examined by the prosecutor in the same order.8 5 In this manner,
the "five" were treated as a group, and their testimonies were regarded
as five parts of the same testimony for procedural purposes. This
arrangement benefited the defendants because it allowed them to
present their full versions in direct examination, before being crossexamined; it also presented them to the court and the audience not as
five separate people but as a united front. The court allowed the
defendants ample time to present their versions; the direct testimonies
took about two to four hours each. Every defendant chose to approach
the testimony in a different manner; some told their personal histories
and how those had led them to oppose the occupation by refusing to
serve. Some gave more general treatises about Israel's policy in the
territories. 866 Although the court did not rule on the legality of the
occupation, 87 it did allow the defendants to speak extensively about the
matter. This strategy of providing nearly unlimited "voice" to the
defendants benefited both parties to the trial. On one hand, in the
symbolic level, the defendants could present their versions to the court
in a coherent, organized, full manner, standing cross-examination only
after all defendants had been heard at length. This testimony style was
later hailed in left-wing publications, who praised the lucid, thoughtful,
and well articulated manifestos of the defendants. 88 On the other hand,
this method also allowed the prosecutor to get a better impression of the
general argument and to organize the cross-examination accordingly.
The direct examinations on July 14 th were interrupted by the
testimony of the Draft Bureau commander as to the act of refusal. This
witness was declared hostile by the defense and cross-examined about
the lack of thorough treatment and complete regulations in the matter of
conscientious objection. Following his testimony, the direct testimonies
85. My description of the proceedings is based on my courtroom observations, carried
between June and September of 2003. Changing the order of direct and cross
examinations is not illegal, but is extremely unusual: Military Justice Act, supra at
note 75.
86. The full text of the testimonies has been since compiled in THE REFUSENIKS
TRIALS (Supra note 74).

87. Supra note 74.
88. KIDRON, supra note 35; KHANIN, supra note 74.
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of the five defendants continued on the same day. The September 1 8th
and October 2 0 th meetings included cross-examination of the
defendants, followed by extensive oral and written summations from
the prosecution and defense throughout November.
The court's verdict was delivered on December 16th. The court
decided to convict the defendants, and it ruled that the current policy,
distinguishing between pacifists and political objectors, was
constitutionally sound. In addition, the court's impression of the
defendants was not of personal morality motivated people, but of
political instigators. 89 An appeal was submitted in the defendants'
name, but later retracted, according to the media out of a conviction that
they "would not receive a fair trial" in the Military Court of Appeals.
The sentencing hearing on December 23 revealed the
difference in opinion about the suitable punishment for the objectors.
The prosecutor's summation referred to the objectors as "ideological
criminals" and argued that they were more dangerous than "ordinary
criminals" but the defense attorney thought their honesty and idealism
merited great leniency. One judge voted for a 20-month punishment,
one for a year-long sentence, and one for merely six months of
imprisonment. According to military criminal procedure, the middle
judge's opinion was accepted. 90
t ,
On February 17tb
weeks after the five were sentenced to
imprisonment, a hearing was conducted to determine whether they
would remain in the military facility or be transferred to a civilian
prison. 91 The military prison services wished to transfer the five but the
prisoners objected, asking to remain in military custody. The final
decision of the committee stated that the parties had agreed that the

89. Matar,supra note 71.
90. Military Justice Act, 1955 (Isr.).
91. This is standard procedure, sanctioned by Article 210 of the Military Justice Act.
Military correctional facilities do not have any rehabilitative, vocational, or
educational programs, and are therefore not suitable for long-term prisoners: On the
other hand, for some soldiers, the encounter with the civilian prison population can be
traumatic. Therefore, every defendant sentenced to more than one year of
imprisonment is brought before a special committee, which decides on the appropriate
facility for the inmate's sentence.
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defendants be transferred to civilian custody. Apparently, after much
deliberation between the committee members (in which no unanimous
solution was reached) they were notified by the five's legal
representative of removing their objection to the transfer. This
consensus, reads the decision, rendered the committee's deliberation
unnecessary. It is hinted, though, that the five felt the army was
"threatened by them." 92 The message conveyed by the five's
representative tells a somewhat different story, according to which in
the hearing the prison representative had indicated his intent to "place
the prisoners under a moral dilemma" and "send them for coercive
labor in the territories." This
message had led them to remove their
93
objection to the transfer.
While the five defendants were serving their imprisonment
terms in different civilian facilities, and anticipating their early release
hearing, 94 their parents started a website 95 in which they requested
funding for the parole hearings. The parental effort on behalf of the five
included a "documentary reading theater," performed in Tel Aviv early
June 2004. The play featured dramatized readings from the trial
records. The defense attorney, Dov Khanin, was scheduled to appear as
himself in the play. 96

92. Decision of Committeefor Inmate Transferral('210 Committee') re Hagay Matar

and Others (IDF,Feb. 17, 2004) (confidential corrections document; on file with
author).
93. Announcement on behalfof the Inmates, submitted to the COMMITTEE FOR INMATE
TRANSFERRAL (Feb. 17, 2004) (confidential court document; on file with author).
94. Hadar Aviram, 'And Justicefor All?'Regarding the Dangerof Generalizingfrom
ExceptionalCases, Following the Rami Dotan Petition, 13 ARMY AND LAW 363
(2001). Officially, early release is available halfway through the sentence, however,
following the verdict in the Rami Dotan case such early release is rare, and it is more
common to be released after serving about two thirds of the sentence. This policy was
criticized, but upheld in the Supreme Court.
95.
http://site234.webhost4life.com/refuz/Default.aspx?alias=site234.webhost4life.com/re
fuz/english.
96. Playprogram, 2004.
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In addition, the defense attorneys of "the five" and Yoni Ben
Arzti (see below) co-edited and published an anthology of court
documents from both cases, including the defendants' testimonies, 97
written and oral summations by the parties, and the court's verdicts.
On July 15th, the parole board decided to shorten the five
objectors' prison sentences by a third. September 15th was established
as their release date. While this was a standard parole release, it had two
unusual features. First, contrary to the prosecution's request, and
contrary to the standard requirement for parolees, "the five" were not
required to express remorse as a condition for their release. Second, the
committee recommended bringing all of "the five" before a military
unsuitability committee in order to allow for their release from service.
B. Are You a Good Pacifistor a Bad Pacifist? The Ben Artzi Case
Concurrent to the "five" case, a separate military trial was
being held for another conscientious objector, Yoni Ben Artzi. Ben
Artzi's case was tried separately because it brought up different
doctrinal questions. Like some of "the five," Ben Artzi had requested
a hearing before the conscience committee prior to being drafted.
However, unlike "the five," he did not merely claim to have left-wing
political views but stated that he was a pacifist and objected to
engaging in any form of military activity. The committee was not
convinced that his mind was fully made up, and he was ordered to
take a year and "solidify his opinion" in the matter of military service.
The following year, Ben Artzi appeared again before the committee,
which acknowledged that his mind was more "solidly made up" about
his refusal to enlist. The Committee decided that he was not a genuine
pacifist and would not be exempted from service. The committee
stressed that Ben Artzi's issues with the army related more to his leftwing views and to his inability to adjust to coercive institutions and
frameworks. 98

97. KHANIN, supra note 74.

98. The history of the case was documented in both the Ben Artzi petition and in
Headquarters 129/03 the Military Prosecutorv. Ben Artzi (2003), excerpt published
in: KHANIN, supra note 74, 333 (henceforth referred to as "the Ben Artzi case") (page
numbers refer to the full, official, unpublished verdict).
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Ben Artzi certainly did not accept this decision quietly. He
submitted a petition for its reversal to the High Court of Justice 99 In
his petition he raised a list of procedural flaws in the Conscience
Committee's hearing, such as the lack of legal representation and the
impossibility to bring witnesses. The court held in his favor and
pressed the military authorities into a compromise which entitled Ben
Artzi to a third appearance before the committee. This time he was
represented by an attorney; submitted an abundance of written
material - including letters from his siblings, both graduate students
in the US; and produced two witnesses: his parents. For the third
time, the committee rejected Ben Artzi's request for exemption, and
expressed its view that political convictions and personal
maladjustments were at the core of his request.
Snippets of the dialogue in the committee hearings were
presented later at the military trial and indicated a problematic and
misinformed approach to the issue, at best. Apparently, the committee
members had shown Ben Artzi headlines from daily newspapers
reports about suicide bombings to confront him with the immorality
of refusal under such circumstances. They also argued that his refusal
stems from his unwillingness to accept authority, which reflected a far
from pacifist personality. 100 Incidents from Ben Artzi's school days one in which he refused to wear a kippa101 to a military cemetery on
Remembrance Day, and another in which he did not participate in a
school-organized bus ride to a demonstration to support the Supreme
Court - were interpreted to illustrate nonconformism and an
unwillingness to adjust to coercive frameworks such as school or the

99. HC 1380/02 Ben Artzi v. The Minister of Security, PD 56(4), 76.

100. Trial transcript (excerpted in KHANIN, supra note 74; this work refers to the full,
unpublished transcript); courtroom observations (field notes, on file with author). One
member referred to the Hebrew word for violence ("alimut") and told Ben Artzi it
meant "no conflict" ("al-imut"; the two expressions do not share a common linguistic
source; moreover, the linguistic example alludes exactly to the opposite). This
fallacious word game was meant to tell Ben Artzi that his various instances of
disagreement and protest in the course of his high school studies demonstrated that he
was not really a pacifist at heart.
101. Yarmulke, a Jewish headcover for men that is customarily worn even by secular
men in cemeteries and funerals.
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army. In addition, Ben Artzi was asked whether he would have fought
the Nazis in World War II. This question, highly problematic in Israel
because of the Holocaust context, puts those subjected to it in a
difficult position: if they answer in the affirmative, they would not be
regarded as pacifists. If they answer in the negative, they would be
02
regarded as having very questionable morality.
An additional complication was Ben Artzi's activism in
support of, and with, politically-motivated objectors such as "the
five." In the Committee's view, his association with left-wing
protesters and the leftist opinions in his immediate family10 3 obscured
the "purity" of his pacifist agenda.
Following the committee's decision, Ben Artzi was ordered to
enlist in the army. Since August 2000 he refused the draft seven
times, each time led to a disciplinary hearing and a prison sentence.
These sentences amounted to over 200 days in prison. Ben Artzi was
indicted in military court when he refused the draft for the eighth
time.
At this trial the parties gave their opening speeches and
testimony was heard. Michael Sfard, a young attorney at a wellknown law office and a conscientious objector himself, presented the
defense's case. He argued the defendant was not guilty of "refusal to
obey orders" because he was a genuine pacifist, a fact which the
committee failed to recognize due to its flawed and unregulated
procedures. The defense made considerable efforts in presenting
various aspects of this argument. To prove Ben Artzi's genuine
pacifism, the defense presented testimony from him and his sister. To
address the committee's arbitrariness and flawed procedure, the
defense asked the court's permission to summon for testimony two
high-ranked officers, including the Conscience Committee Chair. The
prosecutor objected to this move, claiming that the committee's work

102. Trial transcript; courtroom observations (supra note 100).
103. Ben Artzi and his parents were frequently portrayed in the Israeli media as leftwing radicals, and juxtaposed to his uncle and aunt, former Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu and his wife Sarah, often referred to in media coverage of the case: HADAR
AVIRAM, LAW AND SOCIETY ASSOCIATION ANNUAL MEETING: REFLECTIONS OF
DISOBEDIENCE: POWER, IDEOLOGY, AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF RESISTANCE TO
MILITARY SERVICE IN ISRAELI MEDIA (2004).
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had already been scrutinized by the High Court of Justice and did not
need to be discussed any further. The court, however, moved to allow
for both testimonies, stating that they do so beyond their due process
obligations and as a courtesy to the defendant:
The defendant was brought to justice before a military
court for not doing an action which he claims is against
his conscience. In many ways, there is no little
uniqueness in our trial.., in this stage, when the
defendant defends himself with the few tools given to
him by criminal law, we think that we should minimize
using the court's authority to block the defendant's path
from trying to make us doubt, using a tool or this or that
legal construction, that he might not have committed the
offense attributed to him. 104
The court's meeting on June 2 2 nd included the testimony of
Ben Artzi's sister. She was cross-examined about media reports
regarding her brother's leftist views; the sister maintained that her
brother's political views were to be separated from his pacifist views.
The court also heard the testimony of an objector whose views were
similar to Ben Artzi's and who was nevertheless released from
service.
The July 29th court meeting was to be a pivotal date in the
trial's development. After a long examination by the defense, the
Conscience Committee chair admitted that "Yoni genuinely
believe[d] he [was] a pacifist," but that despite this genuine belief, the
committee found him not to be so, due, among other factors, to the
fact that he had stated he would have fought the Nazis in World War
II. The committee chair also testified that the committee did not have
any stated regulations. This testimony led the court to ask the military
authorities to grant Ben Artzi a fourth hearing, this time with a
civilian philosopher as one of the members.
On August 10th the court heard another military officer, the
Head of the Personnel Planning Unit, testify as to the "lighter service"
options he had offered to Ben Artzi - offers which Ben Artzi had

104. The Ben Artzi case, supra note 98.
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declined. Later on the same day, the defense requested that the court
summon Avi Sagi, a philosophy professor at Bar Ilan University, and
the first civilian to be a member of the conscience committee. The
defense wanted Sagi to testify because he had given an interview that
was critical of the Committee's proceedings in the newspaper
Ha'aretz.. This petition stemmed from a Sagi's request not to be
summoned as a defense witness against the committee in which he
had served. The court granted the request, allowing the defense to
summon Sagi as a defense witness, but the defense chose not to do so.
At the same meeting mentioned above, the court asked the
personnel unit to reconsider hearing Ben Artzi's case for the fourth
time. This request was made mostly because of Colonel Simchi's
testimony, which stated the committee thought Ben Artzi to be
genuine in his paficist beliefs. The personnel unit took several days to
consider its position then rejected the court's request. The trial
continued, and the parties' oral summations were heard on October
9th.
In its November 12th verdict, the court acknowledged flaws in
the Committee's proceedings. It stated its belief that Ben Artzi was,
indeed, a pacifist. The court even repeated its request for the
Conscience Committee to hear Ben Artzi's case once more. However,
it still stated that Ben Artzi should have obeyed the order to report for
duty and convicted him. The defense attorney expressed satisfaction
with the "partial victory."
While waiting for the sentence, Ben Artzi appeared before the
committee for the fourth time. The committee decided to release him
from service, but without admitting it had been wrong at denying him
pacifist status. The basis for the decision was that Ben Artzi was
selfish and would not make any useful contribution to the army.
During the committee hearings and in newspaper interviews before
the sentence, Ben Arzti did not express any wish to volunteer for
some sort of alternative service. He wanted only to continue his
studies at the university.
This attitude deviated from the "customary" conscientious
objectors' readiness to engage in non-military voluntary activities,
and infuriated the court as well as the committee. This was mentioned
rather negatively in the sentence given on April 24th, Ben Artzi was
sentenced to two months imprisonment and a fine, which, if unpaid,
would result in two more months of imprisonment. The Ben Artzi
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family reported in an email to its supporters that Ben Artzi did not
intend to pay the fine.
Ben Artzi's appeal of his conviction and sentence was heard
before an unusual set of five judges - all of them were generals by
rank. While the court treated the appellant with dignity and showed a
willingness to discuss literary and philosophical themes it ended up
denying the appeal.
C. Flexibility and Legitimacy
As the stories of the two cases demonstrate, the policies and
practices toward the objectors resemble an exciting game of chess, with
the defendants and their representatives as articulate and resourceful
opponents who respond to the court's strategies with counterstrategies.
The court was willing to allow the objectors in both cases significant
flexibility in their attire and demeanor in court, as well as in
summoning military personnel as hostile witnesses. In addition, the
court is willing to assimilate extra-legal content into the hearings. The
defendants' dissenting ideologies are heard at length, and the court even
delves into their personal biographies to seek the origins of said
ideologies. The following sections in part IV, which provide a reading
of the narratives and ideas in the verdicts, examine the extent to which
this leeway is given in the final decisions.
IV. LEGAL AND EXTRA-LEGAL DISCOURSE IN CONSCIENTIOUS
OBJECTOR VERDICTS

A. Defining the Problem: Highlighting Danger, Downplaying
Controversy
The court's notion of the offenses in both trials is constructed
through the set of narratives surrounding the ethos of compulsory and
egalitarian military. These narratives are the source of the court's
knowledge about the severity and dangers presented by the offense.
Politically motivated conscientious objection is presented as
ideological crime that constitutes a direct challenge to the law's
validity. The dissenters' arguments might persuade others and break
down the ideological-legal fabric on which service is based:
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This is ideological or political crime, and it is more
severe and dangerous than regular criminal activity
stemming from a wish for personal benefit...not only do
they disobey the law, they renounce its compulsory
power. They might be imitated by others, enjoy the
support of people and public institutions, which hinders
an egalitarian enforcement of law, and might gather
around them a large public, who might be prepared to
exhibit violence behavior to the point of mutiny and
rebellion against the
authorized government, that is,
05
democratic society. 1
The patriotic aspect of the duty of military service is
undermined by the ambiguity created by objection and the public
debate surrounding it. Importing political conflict into the military
arena is seen in a negative light due to "the essence of military service
and its connection to life risks; the security situation
of the state and the
1 06
need for personnel to execute military tasks."
The risks embedded in a legalization of conscientious objection
constitute a challenge to both military and egalitarian considerations.
Based on the legal principle of universalism, any right provided for the
defendants must also be provided for everyone else. This theoretical
broadening of the group receiving the rights leads the court to fear the
following scenario:
It is not necessary to prove that acknowledging [the
rights of] selective objectors might import the severe
ideological-political conflict in the public about the
righteousness of the government's actions in the
territories into the arena of military draft, the duty to
serve, and perhaps even into the army... [and
subsequently] split the army into those who are willing
to enlist in an army which engages in certain actions, and
105 Supra note 74, at 67.

106. Compare this enterprise to Simon's account of the Warren Committee's
fascination with Lee Harvey Oswald's childhood biography: Simon, supra note 14, at
91.
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those who are willing to enlist in an army which engages
in other actions. The path from here to a split of the
nation to several nations is107not so far, and there is no
need for experts to prove it.
One topic that remains unelaborated, though by no means
ignored, is the issue of military ethics. The court knowingly and
ostensibly refused to engage in a discussion as to the righteousness of
the defendants' opinions. It chose to decide the case based on the
premise that these positions are subjective. However, the verdicts tread
on thin ice in their treatment of the defendants' perspectives. In the Ben
Artzi case the defendant claimed that from his pacifist perspective the
order to enlist in the army was "clearly and obviously illegal." The
court rejected this claim relying on the Supreme Court order to allow
the draft. The fact that another judicial authority intervened suggests a
set of circumstances where enlistment would not "clearly and
obviously" violate legality:
Even if the test [for a 'clearly and obviously illegal'
command] were subjective, we still thought that the
defendant would have to obey the command. Since the
Israeli Supreme Court ordered the defendant to enlist and
begin his service... a legal obligation [to so do] was
imposed on the defendant. Surely it cannot be said that
an order to obey and order under these circumstances is
an action which is clearly and obviously (even to the
defendant) illegal. 108
The court faces an even more difficult situation in "the five"
case, where the defendants questioned the legality of the army's
involvement in the territories. The solution implemented by the court
107. MAX WEBER, THE METHODOLOGY
The Free Press 1949).

OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

(Edward Shils, ed.,

108. The categories used by the court do not map neatly onto those defined by Rawls;
their "legal" version makes them mutually exclusive for the purpose of classification.
In fact, the categories resemble more a classification unquoted by the court, made by
LINN, supra note 41 following Cohen, supra note 7, between "personal" and
"political" motivations.
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quoted a significant number of Supreme Court decisions authorizing
military activities in the territories, and then stated that despite these
quotes they would not take a stand in the matter:
This court is not, of course, the forum to examine the
legality of this or that governmental action, and it
certainly is not the proper place to examine the
government's policy toward the held territories and their
local inhabitants or the implications of this policy on the
state's citizens. 0 9 We state immediately, our quotation
of the essence of these sources [legitimizing the army's
activity in the territories] was meant only to test the
credibility of the defendants' claims that their conscience
tells them to act like they did... the court does not
intend, is not authorized and is 0even unable to express
any opinion about these claims. "
B. Understandingthe Offenders: "Good" and "Bad" MoralDissent
As explained in sections I.C, II.A and II.B, both trials presented
the court with ideologically motivated, resourceful and articulate
defendants who were prepared to stand trial for their. The legal
system's response to this unique population is evident not only from its
reluctance to reach the stage of military criminal trials, but also from
the court verdicts. Though in most instances the court refers to the
objectors as "the defendants." it also uses their first names, particularly
in the first thirty pages of the "five" case. It also mistakenly refers to
one of the "five" as a "witness," rather than a "defendant."
The uniqueness of conscientious objection cases may therefore
partly account for the court's interest in learning about the objectors'
personalities and motivations. However, the court's endeavors to
understand the defendants in these cases may also stem from the
importance it ascribes to their ideologies, the driving force behind the

109. Supra note 74, at 75.
110. Id. at 18.
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act of conscientious objection. As mentioned above, it is obvious that
the court takes these defendants very seriously; it seeks to learn the
"etiology of ideology" behind the defendants' actions. As the court
poetically phrases it in the Ben Artzi case, it is interested in "the
evolutionary history of his ideological pattern of thinking.., where and
when his thought bloomed with the seeds of thought and pacifist
belief."''
Indeed, both verdicts focus to a great extent on the defendants
and their personal histories. In the "five" trial, the court engages in
meticulous retelling of each and every defendant's personal story,
including their childhoods, the political atmosphere in their homes and
families, their political experiences and activities through middleschool and high-school, and their insights on the situation developed
both before the draft and following incarceration for refusing it. The
verdict contains accounts of an Israeli-Palestinian science summer
camp one of the defendants had participated in while in high school, as
well as the defendants involvement with Palestinian aid organizations
as students. 112 It also contains quotes from the defendants themselves
about their beliefs. 113
The evidence cited in the Ben Artzi verdict includes his
arguments with teachers over school trips involving entrance to the
territories, his mother's account of his refusal to wear a "kippa" in a
military cemetery, extensive testimony by the defendant's sister
(defined by the prosecutor as "an expert witness [whose expertise is]
Yoni"), and references to the opinions of his parents, grandfather,
schoolteachers, and friends about the nature of his objection.
A narrow reading of the court's role questions the necessity for
such information. For the purposes of conviction the only necessary
information is whether the defendants refused to be drafted and whether
they have received exemption as pacifists. (None of them did: the
"five" because they never claimed to be pacifists, and Ben Artzi
because the committee did not grant him exemption despite his claim to
be one). In fact, these are the issues by which the two cases were
S11.Ibid.at 90.
112. Ben Artzi case, at 32.

113. Ben Artzi case, at 8.
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eventually decided. "The five" were not pacifists, and therefore, were
not eligible to be discharged by the conscience committee. Ben- Artzi,
despite his pacifism, was not legally discharged by the committee
whose actions, though faulty, did not render its decision void. The
court, however, sets off on an enterprise to understand the
psychological and historical emergence 11of4 the defendants as
autonomous adult agents with opinions.
This enterprise does not lead the court to draw a comprehensive
and complex portrait of the defendants, but it does lead to the much
more legalistic and prosaic task of classifying them into Weberian
"ideal types" 115 according to their motivation. This classification
process serves the court not only in its decision to convict in both cases,
but also in creating a rhetoric of who should be seen more and less
favorably by the system. For the purpose of this classification, the court
seeks to reduce the opinions and actions of each of the defendants into
monolithic, mutually-exclusive categories based on their main motive:
pacifism (termed "total conscientious objection"), personal discomfort
stemming from political dissent ("selective conscientious objection"),
or a will to bring about a change in public opinion and possibly to
convince others to object to serve ("civil disobedience").
In "the five" case, the court emphasizes the distinction between
the second and third of these categories: selective (political) objectors
whose motive is personal and those whose intentions are to cause
political change. These categories are a simplification of the
philosophical categories of "civil disobedience" and "conscientious
objection."1 16 While the current legal order does not distinguish
between the two for the purpose of the legal/illegal distinction, the courl
might have seen this categorization as an answer to the defense's
argument for acknowledging objection on political, as well as pacifist,
114. Compare this enterprise to Simon's account of the Warren Committee's
fascination with Lee Harvey Oswald's childhood biography: Simon, supra note 14.
115.

WEBER,

supra at note 114.

116. The categories used by the court do not map neatly onto those defined by Rawls;
their "legal" version makes them mutually exclusive for the purpose of classification.
In fact, the categories resemble more a classification unquoted by the court, made by
LINN, supra note 41 following COHEN, supra note 7, between "personal" and
"political" motivations.
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grounds. The court does not give the defense any hope that such rights
might be granted, but even within the group of political objectors, who
do not enjoy the potential of discharge from service, it renders some to
be more positive and less harmful than others. The "good" objector in
this categorization is a good-willed, sensitive individual who does not
seek to change the world, but merely to remove himself from a morally
detrimental environment. This objector can be described as a positive
character and is expected by the court to exhibit altruistic, highly moral
behavior in all respects except willingness to serve in the army. The
"bad" objectors, by contrast, do not conform to this ideal picture. They
are "political" objectors, social agitators who seek political change.
The court finds "the five" (as a group) to fit in the second
category. In the verdict, as well as in the sentence and in previous
decisions regarding their imprisonment terms, the "five" are described
as political changers and revolutionists. This image is created through
an analysis of "the five's" political activities, particularly as highschool seniors. Setting aside the question of jurisdiction over motives
and actions committed by the defendant as civilians, the interesting
notion here is that of monolithic, mutually-exclusive motives for action.
According to the verdict, one can be either a conscientious objector, or
a political advocate of civil disobedience but not both. The court does
pay some homage to Joseph Raz, quoting him to say that it is possible
to be "over-determined" in motivation, and therefore to be both at the
same time, but it prefers its own theory of personality:
We found that we are close to the opinion.., according to
which, although the possibility of duality in motives is
possible, it is, in general, a theoretical and distant
possibility. We thought that the main motive hiding
behind the actions of the defendants before us,
considering the totality of circumstances surrounding
their actions, is the will to cause a political change, that
is, to bring about a change in public opinion and the
governmental
policy.
We
doubt
whether
the
conscientious motive, in itself, is enough to be a basis to
the defendants' refusal, based on the totality of the things
they said. Yet, we are ready to avoid stating
unambiguously, that the civil disobedience motive is the
only one moving the defendants, and to assume, that it is
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also a motive of conscientious objection which moves
them, perhaps even as a sufficient motive, to commit the
act of refusal." 7
This distinction is then abandoned for the sake of the traditional
legal distinction between pacifists and political objectors. For reasons
of manageability the court created a flawed and uneasy equivalence
between the distinction "conscientious objection/civil disobedience"
and the distinction pacifism/political dissent. This was justified by the
need for visible, workable definitions, and even quoted Chief Justice
Barak as to the value of clear definitions at the expense of accurate but
complex ones.
Interestingly, the "good/bad" distinction has nothing to do with
actual goodness or honesty. In the verdict, one of the judges describes
the defendants as "positive and value-minded young men in their
essence,"ll8 praise which is of little assistance as punishment is
imposed. Similarly, the court is at pains to clarify that the virtue of
honesty avails nothing in the legal/illegal distinction:
There is no point to plant within the petitioners' hearts
the illusion, as if the committee might exempt them from
service if it thinks they are honest in what they say, and
it would have been right to clarify to them immediately,
that their refusal to serve, driven by motives of said kind
does not, according to
current policy, award an
19
service.
from
exemption
Ironically, it is precisely the defendants' honesty about their
history and opinions which provided the court with the information that
classifies them as "bad" objectors. Less honest defendants would be
better off by presenting themselves as pacifists and cloaking their
political agendas. The catch is, of course, that conscientious objection is
by definition an offense that stems from honesty and personal integrity.
117. Supra note 74, at 75.
118. Id. at 18.
119. Id. at 90.
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Thus, the defendants' own motives are used by the court to justify their
convictions.
The Ben Artzi case presents more complexity for the enterprise
of classification, as he defies the court's distinction between "good" and
"bad" conscientious objectors in more than one way. He is found to be
a genuine pacifist (despite the committee's findings), but this is hard for
the court to reconcile with his other traits: a radical left-wing political
view and an inability to conform to coercive institutions. Ben Artzi also
refuses to redeem himself in the court's eyes by proclaiming that
contrary to the "good" objector's stereotype,
he will not volunteer to do
20
community service in civilian life. 1
The court tries to make sense of Ben Artzi's enigmatic
personality by collapsing all these complexities and perspective onto a
one-dimensional personality model. Instead of accounting for the
possibility that a person's views on conflict resolution methods can be
detached from his views on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and his
ability to conform, they undo the contradictions by negating their
possibility, or, in the very least, making such a contradiction unlikely.
The judges state that "lack of ability to adjust to a mandatory
framework" and pacifism are linked: a pacifist person is a minority in
Israel and cannot adjust to the framework anyway because of his
unpopular beliefs.
The connection between the two traits is so strong that it cannot,
supposedly, be deciphered. It is, as the court describes it, a chicken and
egg problem: "Is the inability to adjust to the military framework a
consequence of the pacifist belief, or perhaps the pacifist belief is the
cause [sic] of the inability to adjust to, or to accept, the existence of a
military framework, whose goals are defined the way they are defined,
and whose means are the way they are?!"'' z A similar logical ploy
collapses pacifism and left-wing political views into the same category.
"The defendant distinguished... between the pacifist belief and the
political view (though it is clear that a pacifistic view will be difficult to
reconcile with a different political view)."' 122 Thus, Ben Artzi's

120. Supra note 104, at 11.
121. Id. at 32.
122. Id. at 33.
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personality is reconstructed onto a simplified model, allowing for his
classification as a "bad" conscientious objector and leading to his
conviction despite his declaration that he is a pacifist. It also allows for
a negative representation of him in the sentence, which echoes the
committee's original impression of him, while acknowledging that he is
a genuine pacifist.
C. Using Knowledge: Legal andExtra-Legal Sourcesfor Perceiving
the Problem
What are the epistemological sources used by the court to
construct these images of the offense and the offenders? A careful
reading of the verdicts uncovers a self-referential pattern. The court is
exposed to political and philosophical narratives, but it eventually turns
to internal legal sources as its preferred source of knowledge of
conscientious objection. However, the resourcefulness of the defendants
and their representatives does have an influence on the way the legal
sources are applied to the problem.
As shown before, the court does not perceive the offenders to be
regular criminal defendants and even hesitates to refer to them as such.
This avoidance of criminal law as the relevant legal discipline for the
case, which is after all a criminal case, is discernible from the way the
verdicts avoid discussing the elements of actus reus and mens rea. In
fact, the main lexicon the court used in the verdicts is the constitutional
language of rights, and the verdict uses this framework to identify the
questions it wishes to address and answer. In the Ben Artzi case the
court merely wants to identify how much of the defendant's refusal is
political, and thus dangerous, and how much of it is owed to a nonpolitical, low-profile, pacifist perspective that poses fewer problems for
the system: 1) What is the weight of the right to conscience in Israeli
law? 2) Was the defendant's draft legal and valid in respect to the
fallacies in the committee's work - what is the normative meaning of
the committee's decision? 3) Does the defendant enjoy a criminal
defense barring his criminal conviction in the offense he has allegedly

committed? 123

123. Id. at 8.
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The parties' perspectives are also presented in legalconstitutional terms:
Indeed, ostensibly, it seems that each one of the parties is
in a completely different plane in their arguments. The
prosecutor is in the plane of giving validity to the draft
order... and the defense attorney, he is in the plane of
examining the criminal defenses available to the
defendant which stem from the power of the
constitutional right to act according to conscience. 124
Similarly, in the "five" case, the agenda is framed in
constitutional terms and dressed in the philosophical garments of
conscientious objection versus civil disobedience.
A. Have the defendants in their testimonies managed to convince
that their refusal to serve is built on moral-ideological
foundations?
B. Do the reasons for their refusal constitute conscientious
objection, civil disobedience, or a mixture of the two?
C. What is the implication of deciding this question - in case we
are dealing with acts of civil disobedience or mixed acts of
civil disobedience and conscientious objection - do the
defendants then enjoy a defense from criminal conviction?
D. Assuming the defendant's refusal is based on a conscientious
cause (alone or in addition to other causes), does freedom of
conscience enjoy the defense that basic rights enjoy?
E. And if so - is there an existing law, that allows such
infringement in these circumstances? What are the opposing
interests that might justify a violation of the right to free
conscience? Were such interests proved in the case before us?
Has the balancing between them lead to the finding, that the
is in a measure that
violation of the right to free conscience
125
does not exceed the necessary?

124. Id.
125. Supra note 74, at 2.
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The main two branches of knowledge relied upon in the verdicts
to answer these constitutional questions are the judicial art of legal
reasoning (the ability to weigh considerations and interpret laws
correctly) and political philosophy. There are two interesting aspects of
this choice of disciplines. Firstly, the judges do not see any necessity to
get insights from social science or empirical research. This in itself is
not news; the novelty lies in the fact that the "five" verdict explicitly
deals with the question of empirical knowledge and rejects its
relevance. Prompted by the defense's claim, according to which no
empirical evidence was admitted to show the potential danger to the
Israeli state should the defendants' acts be legalized, the court states:
We are speaking of matters that are known to everyone,
things that were claimed again and again in front of the
different courts, and adopted by them. Indeed, the
Supreme Court, sitting as High Court of Justice, stated
the main part of these doubts and dangers, and adopted
them as a cause and a reason to avoid assisting the
petitioners, who had addressed it asking to legally
recognize their refusal to perform military service. 12
In this manner court rulings, by the very fact of their existence
on paper, become empirical evidence. Court opinions, by becoming part
of the precedential historical reservoir, become facts. The court goes
much further by referring to legal and philosophical articles submitted
by the prosecutor as a "BrandeisBrief" They describe its contents as
follows:
To the findings file, which was presented to the court,
were added, in addition to the Supreme Court's verdicts
and those of other (military) courts, articles and letters,
which were written by jurists, philosophers27 and thinkers
from the fields of society and humanities. 1

126. Id. at 88.
127. Id. at 86.
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The "thinkers in fields of society and humanities" mentioned are
six scholars in the fields ofjurisprudence and philosophy. It is unclear
what the "fields of society" are. In any case, the court is obviously of
the opinion that Supreme Court precedents and doctrinal academic
treatises will supply it with all the empirical information it needs about
the risks of conscientious objection.
The discipline of philosophy seems to enjoy a more favored
status in the eyes of the court, but the legal adoption of philosophical
concepts happens in accordance with law's internal terms. Both the
"five" and the Ben Artzi verdicts are filled with quotes from legal
philosophers, but these are not used to achieve any material goals. The
court uses the terms "civil disobedience" and "conscientious objection,"
both staples of political philosophy, but never dives into the
conceptualization behind them. Rather, it chooses to use a crude
distinction between "total objectors" to the military in general and
"specific objectors" to specific military actions, as supposedly
representing the finer distinction suggested by philosophy. As explained
above, this simplification is justified by its workability. It seems that the
homage paid to philosophy is mainly symbolic, and when the court
needs information it prefers to be assisted by juridical wisdom. The
court's reliance on previous verdicts is valid because, according to "the
five" verdict, the different verdicts, fruit of many years of thought,
wisdom and life experience of judges with and without legal education,
comprise within them real evidentiary power, as28far as the interests, the
risks and the dangers we have discussed above.
As to the court's own juridical reasoning and consciousness, this
is described as common knowledge which is within the court's
permissible room for assumption. The verdict states that the national
security situation is within judicial knowledge, and so is the risk to
soldiers in the service that the assumption is "recognizing selective
conscientious objection constitutes a bypass of the democratic process
and an unacceptable interference in it." This is a phenomenon that, if
widened, will lead to a great divide of the Israeli public (another
judicial assumption). As further justification for assuming all these
things, and for not accepting any data to suggest empirical answers for
them, the court compares these cases to "the appraisal of the risk from a
defendant or suspect, whose arrest is being requested based on the
128. Id. at 88.

HeinOnline -- 9 J.L. Soc'y 46 2008

2008 Aviram

47

possibility that he might endanger the public."1 29 The court disregards
the social and political differences between the case at hand and the
example provided.
D. Achieving Goals: Punishingthe Offenders and Obtaining
Legitimacy
Applying the court's perception of conscientious objection to
the offenses and the offenders is aimed at achieving both ostensible and
latent goals, both of which interact with the legal and extra-legal
sources of knowledge used by the court.
The ostensible goal of the court in conscientious objector cases
is achieving the end of punishment, primarily retribution and deterrence
of future potential objectors. In the sentences, the court mentions the
ends of punishment, focusing primarily on deterrence, but mentioning
retribution as an additional reason for harsh punishment. As shown
earlier, the compulsory and egalitarian military ethos that conscientious
objectors resist builds on a patriotic emphasis on the necessity for
defense and social unity. The verdicts, therefore, emphasize general
deterrence as an important aim: "This reason is a clear justification to
punish defendants harshly so that the multitudes to whom the
defendants' call was addressed will see, and fear, and understand,
that
30
the price for an act of refusal is painful, harsh punishment."'
This rationale is particularly important due to the classification
of "the five" as "bad" objectors, whose aim is to influence others, but it
also leads to the court's rejection of personal deterrence as an
appropriate end of punishment in the case. The defense attorney is
quoted saying that such consideration, in light of the ideological motive
of the offenders, makes deterrence not only unnecessary, but
unconstitutional. The court seems to partly agree, and rejects personal
deterrence claiming it would make no sense in light of the defendants'
strong conviction. 131

129. Id. at 89.
130. Supra note 74, at 18.
131. Id. at 17.

HeinOnline -- 9 J.L. Soc'y 47 2008

JOURNAL OF LAW IN SOCIETY 9:1

The court also states, in both cases, its disapproval of the
offenders and uses their classification as "bad" objectors to justify
punishment on the basis of retribution. Most of "the five" verdict, as
shown earlier, uses negative language to describe the defendants and
justify harsh punishment. Retribution, or desert, demands harsh
punishment. Though, the judges are careful to add that "the army's
policy is to be harsh on those who are already in service and decide to
refuse (like between deserters from service and draft evaders)."'1 32 Part
of the retributive consideration in the Ben Artzi case is the court's
133
dislike of his unwillingness to participate in alternative service.
The court's discussion of rehabilitation is particularly insightful.
The sentence renders this end of punishment to be irrelevant for "the
five" conscientious objectors because they were not moved to act the
way they did out of lower social status, falling to poverty or drug abuse;
they did not do what they did as an act stemming from loss of values.
Therefore, and since the defendants have stressed, as mentioned above,
that they do not see themselves serving in the army in the34 future, this
consideration does not have weight in sentencing them. 1
In the court's mind, therefore, rehabilitation is not merely a
general, amorphous consideration; it is something designed and aimed
at the underclass, rather than the affluent and idealistic defendants in
conscientious objection cases. This paragraph shows that the social
resources available to these particular offenders are in the court's mind
even though they do not explicitly mention this in the verdicts
themselves.
The court recognizes that it works side by side with other
military institutions, mainly the Conscience Committee, in its dealings
with conscientious objection. The alliance between the court and the
committee, which occupies center stage in the Ben Artzi case, is an
uneasy one. Although the court defends the committee from the
defense's attacks on its processes and capability, it does not avoid
thinly veiled criticism of the procedure. Similarly, the court is explicitly

132. Id. at 14.
133. Supra note 104, at 10.
134. Supra note 74, at 18.
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uncomfortable with the embarrassment laid at its door by the
committee's chair when he testified that Ben Artzi "genuinely thinks he
is a pacifist" but is not one (see section II.B). The Court comments,
"[w]e cannot imagine, that this part (the defendant's honesty) escaped
the testimony of the135senior officer, but any reference to it was absent
from his decision."'
In light of these ostensible goals, which seem to require harsh
sentences, how does the court justify its procedural flexibility in the
conscientious objector trials and its readiness to let the defendants
'voice' their political opinions and biographies? The answer lies in the
verdict's latent agenda, which is aimed at obtaining legitimacy for its
decision. In order to perpetuate the ethos of compulsory and egalitarian
service, the court needs to reject, epistemologically, the objectors'
position. However, in order for such a decision to be validated by the
verdict's audience - the defendants, the media, the Supreme Court and
academic scholars - the court must show that the decision was reached
in compliance with every possible aspect of judicial fairness. This
requires an absolute lack of bias, particularly of the political persuasion,
procedural flexibility, and a willingness to award the defendants ample
opportunities to state their case.
How does the court display its fairness? As mentioned in part II,
the hearings themselves are an important contribution by being
procedurally flexible and substantively inclusive. The verdicts, too, are
at pains to show the court as a legitimate, unbiased institution. In both
verdicts, ample space was provided for the presentation of the defense
position and compliments are given to the legal representatives of both
parties. The court cleverly dissociates itself from the political issues
raised in the case by presenting the defendants' political criticism as
direct quotations rather than paraphrasing it. These methods present the
court as playing by the rules of the game in a very forgiving manner,
and still reaching the necessary conclusion. 136
135. Supra note 104, at 77.
136. Compare this to similar mechanisms of obtaining legitimacy, such as Hay's
observation of the role of mercy and procedure in legitimizing the usage of death
penalty in Early Modem England, in Hay, supra note 19. Also see: Alan Stone, The
Place of Law in the Marxian Structure/SuperstructureArchetype, 19 LAW AND SOC'Y
REV. 39 (1985).
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V. CONCLUSION: LAW'S RESPONSE TO POLITICAL DISSENT:
SIMPLIFICATION, CATEGORIZATION, AND SELF-REFERENCE

The court, as seen in the cases discussed in this article, works to
make sense of complex people and unclear situations by creating clear
standards and stereotypes to which people must adhere.
This quality of judicial decision-making is not endemic to
judicial decisions regarding conscientious objection. The use of
"masks" to collapse people and situations into easy to handle categories
is extensively discussed by John Noonan. 1 37 He highlights the judicial
tendency to prefer "masks" and rules over persons. Similarly, feminist
socio-legal research has studied the court's response to female
defendants who do not conform to feminine, family-centered
stereotypes. 138 As shown in this literature, the court seeks to reduce
human complexity into manageable compartments. People are expected
to be logical, coherent, and to have specified and distinctive
motivations for their actions.
This is the case with the conscientious objectors in the two
verdicts. The court's understanding of the nature of the problem creates
"good" and "bad" personalities for the defendants, and the verdicts
adhere to these categorizations to make sense out of the situations and
the people involved.
What is unique to the population of conscientious objectors is
the content of the legal categories designed address their actions.
According to the court the key to being a "good" conscientious objector
is to be less politicized, less controversial, and more personable and less
public. The "good" conscientious objector is someone who has a
general, well-developed theory of personal morality. A pacifist
conforms to what the court sees as "pacifist behavior," a pleasant, nonconfrontational person who cares more about personal ideals on social
welfare than about public activism. A "bad" conscientious objector is
137. JOHN T. NOONAN, PERSONS ANtD MASKS OF THE LAW: CARDOZO, HOLMES-,
JEFFERSON, AND WYTHE AS MAKERS OF THE MASKS (Farrar, Straus & Giroux 1976).

138. Bryna Bogoch and Rachel Don-Yichya, GENDER AND LAW: DISCRIMINATION
AGAINST WOMEN IN ISRAELI COURTS (1999); KATHLEEN DALY, GENDER, CRIME AND
PUNISHMENT (Yale University Press 1994); Frances Heidensohn & Marisa Silvestri,
WOMEN AND CRIME (New

York University Press 1995).
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someone who uses his action to influence others, or someone who
defies the positive stereotypes associated with the "good" objector. For
these people, the court borrows, and modifies, the philosophical
concept of civil disobedience.
The court establishes binary monolithic truths by forcing the
complexity of human nature into a framework, and even when the
presence of more than one motive for behavior is evident, the question
is which motive is the dominant one. These motives are then applied by
the court without the aid of any empirical extrapolation tools to make
judgment about empirical risks and chances for limiting rights. For
conscientious objectors, the court conducts an uneasy and inaccurate
dialogue with philosophy, only to reinforce the usage of its own instant,
simple-to-apply categorization. Despite these references to external
disciplines and professional expertise, the court eventually looks into
itself, and into doctrinal law, to create these classification tools. They
trust their own judicial experience to guide it in the right way.
In doing so the court treads a thin line between legal formalism
- the adherence to Weberian categorization of cases - and openness to
the extra-legal issues presented by the objectors. As explained in
section III.D, this course of action serves the court's latent agenda of
obtaining legitimacy. However, the court is not the only party gaining
from this arrangement. The defendants in both cases are, based on their
ideological eloquence and social milieu, people who have powerful
resources at their disposal. Moreover, they are people who chose the
legal arena to make a political point. They knowingly undertake the risk
of being found guilty and suffering the consequences. While in the
narrow sense of legal outcome the objectors lose their cases, the court's
willingness to provide the defendants a platform to express their
political dissent may translate to benefits in the broad arena of public
opinion. 139Although this does not suggest a conspiratorial "bargain"
between the court and the objectors; it certainly shows how choices that
shape the form of a trial may produce a win-win situation, rather than
the more traditional perception of criminal justice as an adversarial,
zero-sum game.
A final comment pertains to the usefulness of using an
examination of knowledge structures, rather than merely concepts of
139. Indeed, the objectors enjoyed a wide, and to a great extent favorable, media
coverage of their trials: Aviram, supra note 103.
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right and wrong, to analyze situations like the conscientious objection
trials. As resistance to governmental actions in general, and to military
actions in particular, continue to occupy legal systems and scholarship,
the discursive analytical framework used here may be useful for
understanding law's interaction with the complex extra-legal factors
which shape such phenomena. Before "taking sides" in the political
controversy, it is useful to observe how the positions of such "sides" are
epistemologically shaped, and what brings about our perceptions of the
problems in question.
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